When the Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP) was first tendered in 2018, it promised to be a model for transparent global participation. Four years later, when a new tender appeared in 2022, it came with subtle — but decisive — changes that reshaped who could bid, how much they needed to pay, and what they stood to gain. Those modifications are now at the center of a Supreme Court challenge filed by SecLink Technologies Corporation, a Dubai-based consortium that claims it was edged out of a project it had already won — at a far higher bid value than the eventual winner, Adani Properties Pvt. Ltd.
The Supreme Court, while refusing to halt the ongoing project, has agreed to examine whether these alterations effectively “disabled” the earlier bidder from competing on fair terms.
The full, monetized value of the Dharavi Redevelopment Project is estimated to be approximately ₹3 lakh crore (about $36 billion), according to project CEO SVR Srinivas. This massive figure is generated primarily through the free sale of a significant portion of the redeveloped land. The project is led by a joint venture, Navbharat Mega Developers Pvt Ltd (NMDPL), with the Adani Group holding an 80% stake and the Maharashtra government holding 20 percent. Monetization will occur through a public-private partnership model that balances rehabilitation with commercial development.
From Open Global Bidding to Conditional Access
The first tender — DRP/1/2018, issued on 28 November 2018 — was designed as a global process. It invited both Indian and international developers to compete on equal footing for the massive 600-acre slum redevelopment project.
By contrast, the fresh tender floated on 1 October 2022 (DRP/2/2022) added several new qualifying criteria that, according to the petition, narrowed the field and shifted the balance toward domestic bidders.
Side-by-Side: The 2018 vs. 2022 Tender Framework
Parameter2018 Tender (DRP/1/2018)2022 Tender (DRP/2/2022)Impact (as per Petition)Minimum Net Worth₹20,000 crore (group-level eligibility)₹20,000 crore (but only from an Indian entity or JV partner)Restricted foreign-led consortiums like SecLink, which had overseas investors but no Indian majority partner
.Land Scope259 hectares (state-owned + notified private parcels)259 hectares + approx. 45 acres of Railways
landInclusion of railway land cited as reason for cancelling earlier tender, though no acquisition was completed.
Bid Security Deposit₹400 crore upfront₹100 crore upfrontRelaxation reduced entry barriers for new bidders
Government Equity in SPV20%20% (unchanged)No change; but overall structure favoured faster handover to lead bidder.
Bid Parameter (Financial Offer)One-time upfront premium to Govt. of Maharashtra“Composite development model” combining upfront + deferred componentsChanged valuation structure made it difficult to directly compare with the earlier ₹7,200 crore bid
.Transferable Development Rights (TDR)Capped and subject to project-linked verificationLiberalised use of TDR with broader trading rightsPetition alleges this benefited real estate–heavy players with large balance sheets.
.Foreign Ownership ClauseAllowed foreign companies registered under relevant FDI normsStipulated “majority Indian participation” for lead memberEffectively excluded fully foreign-led consortiums like SecLink
The Petitioner's Argument: ‘Designed to Exclude’
SecLink’s petition argues that the 2022 tender “fundamentally changed the goalposts”, in violation of Article 14’s mandate for fairness and transparency in public procurement.
The company contends that no substantive reason was offered for cancelling the earlier process, which had already declared it as the highest qualified bidder at ₹7,200 crore — a figure ₹2,100 crore higher than the new winning bid.
It further claims that:
The foreign-participation restriction was added only in 2022, “without any legal or policy basis”.
The reduction in bid security from ₹400 crore to ₹100 crore made it easier for smaller domestic players to enter.
And that the change in TDR treatment effectively turned the project into a commercial real-estate play rather than a rehabilitation-driven redevelopment.
The State’s Defence
The Maharashtra government, in its affidavit filed before the High Court, justified the changes as a “policy decision” necessitated by the inclusion of railway land and the need for a more flexible development model post-pandemic. It also argued that the 2018 tender had lapsed in validity and could not be revived without fresh approvals. The Bombay High Court, in its 20 December 2024 judgment, accepted this view — holding that the cancellation was within the government’s discretion, provided it acted in public interest
Supreme Court’s Reaction: A Split View
When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the bench led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna recorded a nuanced stance:
- It found no immediate fault with the tender’s cancellation, given the railway land inclusion.
- But it flagged the new eligibility terms for potential scrutiny, noting that they “may have the effect of disabling the earlier bidder from participating”
The Court directed the production of all original government files for review and ordered that project disbursements be routed through a single monitored bank account, to ensure transparency while the case remains pending.
Why It Matters
The difference between the two tenders — ₹7,200 crore vs. ₹5,069 crore — is more than arithmetic. It raises broader questions about how public tenders evolve behind closed doors and whether “policy changes” can justify restarting a process already completed.
As the Supreme Court gears up for its October 13, 2025 hearing, those fine-print clauses from 2018 and 2022 may determine the future of India’s most watched urban redevelopment.
Part 1
Dharavi Redevelopment: Inside the Supreme Court Petition that Challenges Maharashtra U-Turn
Document Citations (All from “Dharavi Supreme Court Petition Order”, 2025):
2018 tender (DRP/1/2018): pp. 284–313
- Committee of Secretaries resolution confirming SecLink as highest bidder: pp. 314–322
- Government cancellation & Cabinet resolutions: pp. 330–342
- 2022 tender (DRP/2/2022): pp. 467–656
- Government Resolution modifying new tender: pp. 701–703
- Adani’s Letter of Award: pp. 703–705
- Petition’s allegations on TDR & exclusion: pp. 697–699
- Maharashtra’s affidavit defending changes: pp. 777–797
- Bombay High Court judgment (20.12.2024): pp. 1–24
- Supreme Court order (07.03.2025): pp. 2–3
Part 3 continues the series logically from the Supreme Court’s March 2025 order, focusing on why the Court asked for the original Dharavi redevelopment files and how that step could reshape scrutiny of India’s largest urban renewal contract. |
