deltin55 Publish time 2025-10-8 13:28:26

India’s China Periphery Strategy

In October, India will roll out the red carpet for Mongolia’s President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh. Just two months later, Vladimir Putin will arrive in New Delhi for the annual India-Russia summit. Taken together, the visits highlight a deliberate Indian attempt to deepen ties with countries sitting on China’s frontiers. The message is clear: if China has been encircling India through Pakistan, Nepal, and Myanmar, New Delhi is now quietly testing ways to shape Beijing’s own periphery.
For decades, India’s China policy was defensive, focused on border management, crisis signalling, and selective economic decoupling. But Beijing’s playbook has always been outward. China has sought buffers, partners, and alternative access routes across its periphery: Central Asia, Russia, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia. India is beginning to mirror this approach, not to provoke but to balance, by building relationships with states that matter to China’s strategic depth. Hosting Mongolia and Russia in quick succession reflects this widening lens. The two partners are very different in scale and orientation, but each offers India leverage on Beijing’s doorstep.
Mongolia: A Test Of India’s Reliability
Mongolia is the classic “small power caught between giants.” Landlocked, resource-rich, and dependent on China for over 90 per cent of its trade, Ulaanbaatar has long pursued a “third neighbour” policy, seeking balance through ties with countries like India, Japan, and the US. For India, Mongolia is both a civilizational partner (linked through Buddhism) and a geopolitical signal: that New Delhi can engage China’s northern frontier in ways that are cultural, developmental, and strategic.
India has already offered a $1 billion credit line and is helping build Mongolia’s first oil refinery. But the real question is whether India can deliver. In Ulaanbaatar, promises matter less than pipelines, scholarships, and credible defence cooperation. If Khürelsükh’s visit accelerates these projects, Mongolia will view India as a serious third neighbour. If not, China’s overwhelming presence will continue unchecked.
Russia: A Partner China Assumes It Owns
If Mongolia is about scale-building, Russia is about scale-balancing. Moscow today is tethered to Beijing by necessity, thanks to Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine. Yet it remains a major power shaping China’s northern flank and Central Asian backyard.
India cannot pull Russia out of China’s orbit. But it can prevent a total eclipse. By sustaining annual summits, defence ties, and energy cooperation, New Delhi keeps alive a multipolar space in which Russia sees India as more than a junior buyer of oil or arms. Putin’s December visit is as much about reassurance as opportunity: reassurance that India still values Russia despite its Chinese tilt, and opportunity to discuss regional linkages, from Central Asia to the Arctic, that complicate Beijing’s monopoly.
Seen together, Mongolia and Russia illustrate the two prongs of a nascent Indian periphery strategy. First, with small states like Mongolia, offer alternatives to Chinese dominance through credible projects, cultural diplomacy, and defence partnerships and the second, with major powers like Russia: Maintain enough engagement to prevent China from enjoying uncontested primacy.
This duality is essential. Overplaying Mongolia and India risks symbolic gestures without real weight. Overplaying Russia and India risks becoming entangled in its disputes with the West. Balance both, and India begins to mirror China’s approach, surrounding a rival with options and relationships that dilute its leverage.
The Pitfalls To Avoid
Such a strategy, however, must avoid three traps:
Symbolism without Substance: Mongolia will not risk angering China unless India demonstrates delivery. Likewise, Russia will not tilt towards India unless annual summits translate into visible cooperation.
Zero-sum Framing: India should not push its partners to “choose” between New Delhi and Beijing. Mongolia and Russia will hedge; India must accept and work within that hedging.
Neglecting the Wider Arc: A China-periphery strategy cannot rest on just two visits. Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Russian Far East all matter. This must be seen as a continuum, not a one-off.
Lessons from Beijing’s Playbook
China has long treated India’s periphery as fertile ground: funding Nepali infrastructure, leveraging Pakistan as a proxy, offering Myanmar ports and arms. India is borrowing from the same playbook. If sustained, this approach sends a signal to Beijing: that India can shape not just the Himalayas or the Indian Ocean, but also the chessboard north of the Great Wall.
The real test is follow-through. If President Khürelsükh leaves New Delhi with signed, progressing projects, Mongolia’s faith in India deepens. If Putin’s December summit reaffirms long-term energy, defence, and connectivity partnerships, Russia’s view of India as a necessary counterbalance survives.
Together, these visits can mark the start of something bigger: an Indian foreign policy that is no longer confined to protecting its own borders but confident enough to shape the spaces beyond China’s.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication.
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